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How has China formed its conception of the rule of law? 
-- A Contextual Analysis of Legal Instrumentalism in the ROC and the PRC Law-making 
 
I Introduction  
The rule of law as a globally recognized concept is multifaceted (Chesterman, 2008). In the 
Common Law tradition it is conceived through a formal and substantive framework. In 
essence, it centres on the supremacy of the law over the arbitrary exercise of power and the 
formal legality of the law (Tamanaha, 2004, p.115; Cotterrell, 1992, p.157).
 
The rule of law 
concept has been criticized as being of unique European origin, where plural social 
organization and universal natural law constitute its two preconditions (Unger, 1977, pp.80-
110). It has, however, been advocated around the world as one essential principle leading to 
modernity, where the legitimacy of the law based on the formal and substantive rule of law 
serves as a strong symbol for a modern society (Deflem, 1996, p.5).   
 
The modernization of China started by the imperial Qing court at the end of the last Qing 
Dynasty at the beginning of 20
th
 century, continued during the time periods of the Republic 
of China (ROC 1911-1949) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC 1949-). Despite their 
political and ideological differences, both the ROC and the PRC have striven to build up 
modern legal systems with the aim of leading China into modernity. However, the formation 
of the legal system in both the ROC and the PRC has been criticized for conferring a strong 
instrumental role onto the law to achieve policy goals (Chen, 2008) and, therefore, suffering 
from the underdevelopment of the rule of law.     
 
In its modernization efforts in the past hundred years，China has been well exposed to the 
legal norms of western legal systems including the concept of the rule of law. The formation 
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of the legal system in the ROC was carried out with international legal assistance and the 
advice of American jurist Roscoe Pound (Kroncke, 2012).
 
The PRC showed enhanced 
participation in international legal systems through the membership of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001 (Qin, 2003).
 
The question arises, therefore, as to why both the 
ROC and the PRC have chosen to focus on the instrumentality of the law in their construction 
of the rule of law, and shied away from viewing the law as an autonomous and neutral 
institution imposing constraints on the exercise of power.  
 
This question requires an answer because the rule of law development in the PRC cannot 
escape from its past. However, western studies on the rule of law in China tend to focus on 
traditional Chinese law and the PRC law (Peerenbolm 2002, 2004). Moreover, although 
studies have pointed out the instrumental role of the law in Chinese legal history (Chen 2008), 
little efforts have been made to analyse to what extent and why such a view persists in the 
Chinese society and the impact of such a view on China’s rule of law today. More 
importantly, the PRC has become increasingly assertive in its legal practice in the context of 
economic globalization, and reveals a desire to become a norm-maker rather than a norms 
taker. Hence to critically understand the contextual and historical factors shaping China’s rule 
of law would be beneficial for understanding the Chinese perspectives of the rule of law and 
the impact of such perspectives on China’s legal practice today. 
 
For the first time this paper compares the ROC Statute Legislative Order of 1928 and the 
PRC Legislation Law of 2000 in Chinese legal history. The ROC Statute of Legislative Order 
and the PRC Legislation Law serve as the first and essential building blocks for the 
respective legal systems. They serve, therefore, as good case-studies when seeking to 
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understand how the notion of the rule of law has been conceived in the ROC and the PRC, 
and if there are any similarities between them.  
 
By briefly reviewing China’s legal modernization reform since the late Qing period, this 
paper compares the Statute of the Legislative Order enacted by the ROC and the Legislation 
Law enacted by the PRC. It argues that strong similarities exist between the two legislations 
in terms of definition of sources of law; law making procedure; and the role played by the 
ruling party in the law making process. The similarity, as this paper argues, reveals that the 
ROC and PRC favour the instrumentality view of the law to the extent that such a view has 
become the main basis of China’s conception of the rule of law. This paper argues that two 
reasons contribute to the formation of such a view: a China-centred legal borrowing strategy 
designed by elites in late Qing Dynasty and inherited by the ROC and PRC; and, the 
instrumentality view of the law consistently held by Chinese traditional philosophies and 
ideologies upheld by the ROC and the PRC. Hence, China’s consistent legal borrowing 
strategy and continuous interaction between traditional philosophies and state ideologies in 
the ROC and PRC have shaped and continue to shape the formulation of the rule of law in 
China.     
II Law-making in the ROC and the PRC   
2.1 Legal System Reform in the Late Qing Period, the ROC and the PRC  
The reform of China’s legal system started in the early 20
th
 century, when China’s last 
Dynasty, the Qing (1644-1911), was in decline and was seeking a means for revival (Chen, 
2008: 23).
 
Having pursued a closed and centralized form of imperial rule, the Qing was 
forced open by the industrialised West and faced external and internal pressures to engage in 
modernization reform (Tay, 1969).
 
 International legal norms embodied in the unequal 
treaties concluded between China and the western powers served as the incentive for Chinese 
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elites to urge reform by referring to state building models in Europe and elsewhere (Horowitz, 
2004).
 
 
  
Reformists maintained that a key part of the Dynasty’s reform efforts should be in the 
development of a new legal system, modelled on western examples. In January of 1901, the 
Empress Dowager, Ci Xi (1835-1908), issued an edict calling for the reformation of Chinese 
law along the lines of western models. However, these efforts ended abruptly when the 
Dynasty was overthrown during the Xin Hai revolution in 1911, and replaced with the 
Republic of China. Although the Qing Court’s legal reforms were short-lived, they marked 
the beginning of the reform of Chinese law on the basis of international legal norms, and the 
Civil Law tradition exhibited by leading European legal systems (Chen, 2008, 24).
  
The ROC continued to face the task of modernization through state building. 
Constitutionalism and authoritarianism dominated China’s institutional design efforts. 
Presidential and cabinet styles of government alternated in China during this period, which 
saw the country racked by corruption and war (Zhao, 1996, p.28). With the success of the 
Northern Expedition (1926-1928) against local warlords, the Guomindang (GMD, or the 
Nationalist Party) unified China and established a national government on 1 July 1925 in 
Guangzhou.  
Dr Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925), the founder of the GMD set out the blueprint for the ROC of 
China in his publication Jian Guo Fang Lue (A Program of National Reconstruction 1924). 
He argued that given China’s millennium of imperial history, the revolution work led by the 
GMD in ROC should be undertaken in three stages. These three stages were the Military 
Tutelage to destruct the Manchu Tyranny in the Qing Dynasty; the Political Tutelage to 
develop the provisional Constitution, train the mass public on political rights and promote 
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local county self-governance; and the stage of the Constitutional state. (Sun Yat-Sen, 1924, 
p.64 ).  
Sun argued that the GMD should complete the state building in the political tutelage. The 
state structure should include the National Congress and the Central Government covering 
five Councils (yuan) of administration, legislation, judiciary, examination and supervision. 
 
(Sun, 1924, p.65).
 
During the Military Tutelage (1925 -1928), the government and the military establishment 
were combined together, and legislative procedures had not yet been established. In April of 
1927, Chiang Kai-Shek (1887-1975), the successor to Sun Yat-Sen and then head of the 
GMD, moved the nationalist government from Guangzhou to Nanjing and set up a central 
government in line with Sun Yat-Sen’s design.  
In 1928, the GMD publicised the Political Tutelage guidelines following the GMD 2
nd
 
Congress fifth Plenum. The Guideline set out the policy basis for the GMD to play a leading 
position in the law-making process. It ensured that during the Political Tutelage, the GMD 
National Congress would replace the National Congress to lead the ROC; when the GMD 
National Congress is not in session, the power would be delegated to the GMD Central 
Executive Committee; the GMD central executive committee would supervise the central 
government’s execution in the five yuan; and, that the GMD central executive committee was 
responsible for the amendment and interpretation of the National Government organization 
law.
1
  
In terms of legal system building, the ROC continued the unfinished reforms of the Qing 
period. In 1925, the ROC central government conducted a review of all applicable laws, 
                                                            
1
 GMD Political Tutelage Guideline, Chinese Encyclopaedia On Line, available at 
http://ap6.pccu.edu.tw/Encyclopedia/data.asp?id=3392. 
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which were based on the Qing legal code and customary laws. It then set up the Legal Code 
Draft Committee (LCDC), with the aim of reducing litigation and taking back the consular 
jurisdiction, formerly held by foreign powers in China.
2
 In 1927, it decided that all preceding 
laws could be applied until new laws had been enacted, except for laws that contravened the 
GMD’s party ideology or other orders issued by the ROC government.
3
 
On 27 February 1928, the ROC enacted the Statute of Legislative Order (Statute), and on 23 
June 1932, the Amendment of the Statute of Legislative Order. These statutes set out the 
main legal basis for regulating the law-making process. After the enactment of the Statute, 
the ROC went through a rapid process of law-making and completed the enactment of six 
codes, namely the Constitution, the Civil Code, the Criminal Code, the Civil Procedure Code, 
the Criminal Procedure Code and the Administrative Code. The enactment of the six codes 
was regarded as a landmark event in the achievement of legal modernization in the ROC (Tay, 
1969).   
The ROC’s legal system building was interrupted by World War II and then the Civil War 
between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the GMD, from 1945 to1949. In 1949, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power and established the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). The CCP is organized with a strict institutionalized structure. It is headed by 
the CCP National Congress and Standing Committee, which is led by the Politburo (Political 
Bureau). The Members of the Politburo serve as state leaders and oversee corresponding state 
matters. Within the State apparatus, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing 
Committee (NPCSC) serve as the legislature. It creates and supervises other state organs, 
                                                            
2 Legislative Committee Report on the Review of Six Laws 17 October 1925. The Legislative Committee 
decided that no amendment was needed to the Organization Law of the ROC government, Regulation on the 
Organization of Secretariat of the ROC government, Organization Law of the Department of Finance of ROC, 
and Organization Law of Provincial Government. 
3
 Nationalist Party Central Political Congress Document on Law-Making issued on 12 August 1927.   
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including the government administrative system, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate.  (Wu, 2013, p.72)   
The CCP began its socialist state building, including legal system building, with reference to 
the USSR’s socialist legal tradition. However, from the 1950s to 1978, the formal legal order 
building in the PRC suffered serious setbacks and was paralyzed due to continuous political 
movements (Zhu Sanzu, 2011, pp.91-133). In 1978, the CCP resumed its legal system 
building, with the aim of supporting its market-oriented reforms (Potter, 2003, p.107).
 
 This 
process was reinvigorated by China’s membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001, as the PRC had an international legal obligation to ensure legal and regulatory 
consistency with WTO agreements and its WTO-plus commitments (Qin, 2003).
 
  
From 2001 China has speeded up its legal system building and pledged to have completed the 
Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics (SLSCC) in 2011. During the process, 
the State Council (central government) published the White Paper on the Rule of Law in 
China in 2008.
4
 The White Paper essentially reviewed China’s legal system building in the 
law-making process; the facilitation of the market economy; governments’ rule by law; the 
judiciary; human rights; legal education and international legal collaboration. In 2011, the 
State Council published the White Paper to declare the completion of the SLSCC, on the 
grounds that China has built up an institutionalized and legalized system for law-making, and 
has promulgated a complete and comprehensive body of laws with the Constitution as the 
cornerstone. 
5
   
Since 1980, the PRC’s law-making principles have been developed through practice yet not 
legalized. Leading CCP law-makers argued that these principles included that the law-making 
                                                            
4
 White paper on the Rule of Law in China in 2008, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/news/2008-02/28/content_11025486.htm.  
5
 White paper on Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics in 2011, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7137666.htm. 
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should be based on the reality of China and be compatible with China’s economic and class 
relationships; that the law-making should uphold socialist ideology and serve the purpose of 
protecting the socialist political and economic systems; that the law-making should be based 
on socialist democracy and encourage public participation; and the law should be less 
punitive and cruel. (Zhang Youyu, 1980).    
By 2000, China had achieved remarkable GDP growth yet faced pressing challenges in the 
legality of the law making. These challenges can be observed in the lack of consistency in 
law making and the abuse of discretion by local law-makers due to local protection. This,  
consequently, caused contradictory laws and the enactment of laws with no legal basis.
6
 In 
the meantime, China was under increasing pressure to review its legal system with the aim of 
joining the WTO. Amidst this background, the Legislation Law, which started its preparation 
in 1993, was promulgated in 2000 and amended in 2015. The Law served as a starting point 
for China to build a socialist legal system in the post-WTO membership era.  
 It was in the Legislation Law that the practice-based law-making principles were, for the first 
time, legalized (Zhou Wangshen, 2009, p.71). Art. 3 to 6 of the Legislation Law provides that 
law making should uphold Constitutional principles, including the upholding of socialist 
ideologies, the CCP leadership, the economic reform and opening up; law making should 
follow legally provided procedures, protect the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal 
system and achieve collective state interests; law making should reflect the people’s will and 
promote socialist democracy and safeguard people’s participation; law-making should be 
                                                            
6
  Mr Gu Angran, Director of Legislative Affairs Committee of NPCSC, Statement on the Necessity to 
promulgate the Legislation Law, delivered at the 9th National People’s Congress 3rd Plenum held on 9 Marc 
2000. http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/16/content_5008936.htm.   
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based on reality and set out the rights and obligations for citizens, legal persons and other 
organizations as well as the rights and responsibilities for state institutions.
7
  
2.2. Law-making process in the ROC and the PRC  
Hence to legalize the law-making process was the first step undertaken by the ROC and the 
PRC in their respective legal system building. A comparison between the ROC Statute of the 
Legislative Order in 1928 and the PRC Legislation Law in 2000, and their subsequent 
amendments, reveal strong similarities with respect to the definitions of sources of law, law-
making procedure and the relationship between the ruling party and law-making.    
First, the Statute of Legislative Order and the Legislation Law provide similar definitions of 
the sources of Chinese law, and have the common goal of building a hierarchical system of 
law and regulation.   
The Statute defines the sources of law in the ROC as including primary law (Falu), which is 
debated for up to three readings in the Legislative Yuan and promulgated by the central 
government; secondary rules for the enforcement of the law, i.e., regulations (Guizhang) 
enacted by the central government and its departments; and rule (Tiaoli) by provincial and 
municipal governments (Gilpatrick, 1950).
 
 The Statute states that regulation and rules cannot 
contravene law.
8
 In particular, when the departments of the central government make 
departmental regulations, such regulations should be scrutinized by the central government 
regarding its uniformity with relevant laws.
9
 
Similarly, the Legislation Law sets out the sources of Chinese law. These include the law 
(Falu) enacted by the National People’s Congress; administrative regulations (Tiaoli, 
Guiding or Banfa) enacted by the State Council (central government); administrative rules 
                                                            
7
 Art.3-6 the Legislation Law 2000.  
8
 Art. 4  the Statue of Legislative Order 1928.    
9 Art. 3 supra.  
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(Guizhang) enacted by the State Council organs; local regulation enacted by the local 
People’s Congress (Di Fang Tiaoli); and local rules (guizhang) enacted by local governments. 
The State Council regulation and rules are enacted with the aim of enforcing laws, 
particularly within relevant sectors. Local regulations and local rules are enacted with the aim 
of enforcing primary laws and State Council regulations within local areas, and are applicable 
only within local jurisdictions.
10 
These sources of law exist within a hierarchical order, in 
terms of their respective legal powers.
11
 Hence, the Statute and Legislation Law establish a 
similar structure for the legal system in the ROC and PRC, which is composed of codified 
legislations in the order of primary law, regulations and rules.   
Second, both the Statute and the Legislation Law regulate the law-making process with the 
aim of making the process rational and ordered. Whereas, law-making in the ROC was led by 
the legislative yuan of the central government, it is overseen by the legislature, namely the 
NPC and NPCSC, in the PRC. Furthermore, the PRC’s Legislation Law amendment in 2015, 
has shown enhanced efforts to improve the transparency, legality and consultation of its law 
making process.     
Under the framework of the Statute of the ROC, the law-making body of the ROC is the 
legislative yuan of the central government. Legislative proposals can be initiated by the 
Central Political Council of the GMD, and the organs of the National Government, including 
the five yuans.
12
 Debates on the contents of a bill are placed before the executive yuan with 
possible reference to the relevant yuan for consultation. After approval by the executive yuan, 
the bill goes to the legislative yuan for three readings. The bill is then passed to the central 
government for promulgation (Gilpatrick 1950).
 
 
                                                            
10
 Art.5 supra.  
11
 Art. 3 supra.  
12 Art. 1 of the Statute Amendment.  
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Under the framework of the Legislation Law of the PRC, the law-making bodies in the PRC 
are the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee (NPCSC). State 
institutions including the central and local governments, or a group of thirty or more NPC 
deputies, can submit a legislative bill to the NPC presidium for scrutiny, in order for the bills 
to be listed on the agenda of the National People’s Congress for deliberation.
13
 The bills 
listed on the agenda can be deliberated up to three times for promulgation by the NPC and 
NPCSC.
14
  
In comparison, the Legislation Law amendment in 2015 reveals the PRC’s efforts to improve 
the transparency and consultation of the law-making process. Pursuant to the amendment, the 
NPCSC, in deliberation, should collect feedback from the NPC through various means, 
including in the format of a hearing or on-site field research.
15
 The NPCSC undertakes an 
assessment on the feasibility, timing and social impact of the potential bill, and the results are 
considered by the NPC Legislative Committee in its production of the final bill.
16
    
Furthermore, this amendment increased the legality and certainty when making secondary 
legislations. It explicitly states that the making of secondary legislations must be consistent 
with their legal basis. Hence, State Council administrative regulation, local people’s congress 
regulation, and local city rules cannot reduce rights and welfare, or add new obligations to 
citizens, legal persons and other organizations, without a legal basis in law.
17
 The PRC 
central government acts as a protagonist in making secondary legislations and can, based on 
necessity, adopt secondary legislations when there is no prior primary law in place, with a 
                                                            
13 Art. 12 and 13, the Legislation Law 2000. 
14
Art. 20 and 21, the Legislation Law 2000. 
15
 Art.16, 28 and 26 of the Amendment of the Legislation Law 2015. 
16
 Art.39 of the Amendment of the Legislation Law 2015.  
17 Art.80 and 82 of the Amendment of the Legislation Law 2015.  
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delegation of power from the NPCSC.
18
 The amendment ensures that the delegation of power 
is under more stringent scrutiny in terms of its necessity and application.
19
  
Third, whereas the GMD was, in the Statute, formally provided as one party with competence 
to submit legislative proposals, the CCP in the Legislation Law is more invisible. However, 
in both legislations the law making process is led and subject to legally provided scrutiny by 
the GMD and CCP.    
 Pursuant to the Statute, each legislative proposal is required to submit its legislative 
principles explaining the rationale for the law-making. The Statute provides that for the 
legislative proposal, put forward by the GMD, the legal principles would be set out by the 
GMD Central Political Council and, hence, subject to no further scrutiny. For legislative 
proposals put forward by the central government, the five yuan, or other institutions, the legal 
principles of the proposal were reviewed and decided by the GMD Central Political Council 
itself.
20
    
The Statute provided that the legislative yuan did not have the competence to change the 
legislative principle set out by the Central Political Council, though it had the competence to 
state its opinions at the Council. Further, the legislative bill, produced and reviewed by the 
legislative yuan, could be subject to changes when the Central Political Congress deemed this 
necessary, before publication.
21
   
Art.3 of the Legislation Law in the PRC provides that the law-making must comply with the 
principles of China’s Constitution, which are to  “…. uphold the ideology of socialism, … [as 
well as] the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, [and] the thought of Marx, Lenin, 
                                                            
18
 Art.11 and 12 of the Amendment of the Legislation Law 2015.  
19
 Art.11 and 12 of the Amendment of the Legislation Law 2015.  
20
 Art. 5 the Statute Amendment.  
21 Art. 10 the Statute Amendment.  
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Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. ….”.
22
 The NPC interpretation of the Legislation Law 
provides that to uphold the leadership by the Chinese Communist Party is a Constitutional 
Principle of the Chinese legal system. Therefore, pursuant to the NPC, the CCP leads China 
by focusing on the ideology, direction and policy of China’s development and the law-
making process serves the purpose of enabling the CCP to transform its party policies into 
legal instruments, which are then enforced through the state apparatus.
23
 In practice the CCP 
initiates legislation proposals to the NPC and NPCSC for law-making. The CCP members 
and party secretary within the NPC and NPCSC are the main channels to express the Party 
opinions on the proposal and bear the obligation to develop relevant proposals into state-
made laws (Wang Lifeng, 2014, 128) 
A comparison of the Statute of Legislative Order 1928, and the Legislation Law 2000, reveals 
that the ROC and PRC both view law essentially as an instrument, on the one hand, to 
facilitate the GMD’s and CCP’s administration of Chinese society through rationalizing the 
legal structure and filling the gap of substantive legal subjects, and, on the other, to translate 
the ruling party’s policies into state-enforced laws. This view reflects the fact that the essence 
of the rule of law embodied by the Statute 1928 and the Legislation Law 2000, is not based 
on the formal rights-based rule of law principle, but rather based on seeing the law as an 
empty vessel to achieve the common social good defined and/ or compatible with the ruling 
party’s ideology and interests.  
Why have the ROC and the PRC shared a similar instrumentality conception of the rule of 
law, despite their political and ideological differences? This paper argues that a China-
focused legal borrowing strategy developed from the late Qing period and the continuous 
focus on the instrumentality of the law running through the traditional Chinese philosophies, 
                                                            
22
 Art. 3 the Legislation Law.  
23
 NPCSC interpretation of the Legislation Law 2000 available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flsyywd/xianfa/2001-08/01/content_140406.htm  
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GMD’s San Min Zhu I and CCP’s socialist ideological reinventions contribute to providing 
the answer.     
III China’s legal borrowing strategy in the ROC and the PRC  
 
Legal borrowing has played an indispensable role in the process of China’s legal reform 
efforts, starting in the late Qing period. However, the Qing Dynasty’s reference to the 
western legal system did not aim to westernize the failing Qing Court. Instead, as Zhang 
Zhidong (1837-1909), one of the Qing Court’s conservatives advocated, things were to be 
done in a proper sequence: 
In order to render China powerful and at the same time preserve our own institutions, 
it is absolutely necessary that we should utilize western knowledge. But unless 
Chinese knowledge is made the basis of education and a Chinese direction given 
thought, the strong will become anarchist and the weak the slave (Zhang and 
Translated by Woodbrige,1900, p.63).
 
 
Zhang’s argument can be summarized into his famous proposal as Zhongxxue wei ti, Xixue 
wei yong; namely, that Chinese scholarship should be the foundation and western scholarship 
the application. The argument was widely accepted by the Chinese elite and continued to 
exert an influence on Chinese society in the century that followed.
 
 
A legal reform commission was set up which followed this principle. The commission 
carefully examined different foreign models, including those from Japan, Europe and the US. 
Japan’s model was recommended given that China and Japan were similar in terms of history, 
culture and political ideology, and because Japan had successfully transformed into a 
powerful constitutional monarchy as a result of introducing western-style legal reforms 
(Huang, 2013).
 
The commission revised the punitive old law, the Qing Code by abolishing 
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the cruelty provisions. It then made efforts to make a new code, namely the Da Qing Ming Lu, 
which provided regulation for civil and commercial legal relationships that were non-existent 
in the Qing Code (Philip Huang, 2001, p.15). Foreign legal norms were referred to in the 
drafting of general principles and obligations in the new code. However, drafting on the 
topics of family and succession, which the Qing Code already contained, were left to Chinese 
scholars (Chen, 2008, p. 26).  
When the ROC continued with legal reforms following the Qing Court’s efforts, it also 
refused to “westernize” Chinese law. It separated laws regulating private relations from the 
previous Qing Code and enacted new laws to fill in legal gaps (Philip Huang 2001, p.56). By 
the time the Statute of Legislative Order was enacted, the ROC had clearly identified the 
principles it would adhere to in its legal modernization. These principles can be observed in 
the making of the ROC Civil Code -- one of the fundamental Six Codes regulating private 
parties’ civil and commercial relations. The Civil Code purported to have referred to and 
absorbed a rich body of civil laws from other legal systems, in particular from German law. It 
purported to have taken into consideration the local customs of China and, more importantly, 
that it had a deliberate social character, in order to pursue collective rather than individual 
interests (Ching Lin Tsai et al, 1930 p.xxi).
 
   
Hu Hanming (1879-1936), one of the leading law-making figures of Republican China, 
indicated that the Civil Code should seek a path superior to communism and capitalism, 
based on San Min Zhu I (the Three Principles of the People)  --  the guiding ideology of the 
GMD (Ching Lin Tsai et al 1930 p.xxi ). Thus, the overarching aim of the Civil Code in the 
Republic of China was to achieve social equilibrium between individual interests and 
collective interests. The jurists, or the members of the drafting committee, were determined to 
bring Chinese law up to the standards of what they believed to be the most advanced 
international legal norms. For them, the modernization of Chinese law could only be 
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achieved by drawing on what they considered the best from the West, while adapting this 
‘best’ to Chinese realities (Philip Huang, 2001, p.53).
 
 
This was also the case in the PRC. In Mao’s China (1949-1976), the development of the 
Chinese legal system referred heavily to the USSR socialist legal system and the latter’s legal 
doctrines. China applied the socialist legality doctrine where the law should be subordinated 
to  political flexibility. However, China showed a more obvious instrumentality conception of 
legal rules in comparison with the USSR (Castellucci 2012). 
After the Cultural Revolution, Peng Zheng, one of the CCP reformists (1902-1997) designed 
and led the legal reform from 1978. Peng held a strongly socialist and legalist view of the law, 
under which the law was viewed as an instrument to achieve the CCP’s policy goals (Cai 
Dingjian, 2010). In this period, the law governing China’s economy was regarded as an area 
in which the CCP lacked the most experience. Reference was inevitably made to international 
legal norms by the CCP in this area. However, such reference, according to Peng Zheng, was 
to be made on the precondition that they served the CCP’s policy goals (Potter, 2003, p.201).
 
 
 
A China-focused legal borrowing strategy has been developed to become one of the 
principles supporting the PRC legal reform. The 2008 white paper provides that the 
construction of the socialist rule of law must be based on the needs of societal economic 
development. It should not copy other legal systems and political systems but should refer to 
international experience by referring to the reality of Chinese society. 
24
 The same argument 
was provided by the 2011 White Paper, where China’s reference to foreign laws was required 
                                                            
24
 2008 China’s White Paper on the Rule of Law, part 8, available at http://www.china-
un.org/chn/zjzg/zfbps/t411158.htm.  
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to enable the law-making in China to be compatible with China’s context and consistent with 
the trends of global legal development.
25
 
 
A China-focused legal borrowing strategy can be observed in the PRC’s enactment of the 
Contract Law in 1999, which was a cornerstone in the construction of a market economy. In 
developing its Contract Law, China turned to international legal norms for reference, 
including the UNIDROIT principles (Bonell, 2005, p.38). Consequently, the 1999 Contract 
Law reflects a strong convergence with UNIDROIT principles in areas such as the formation 
and performance of contracts (Zhang and Huang, 2003). However, the PRC’s reference to the 
principle of freedom to contract reveals its legal borrowing strategy. Art. 1 of the UNIDROIT 
sets out that the parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its content. It further 
sets out that the principle is subject to limitations set out by mandatory rules at the national 
and international levels, and can be derogated in economic sectors where there is no 
competition.
26
   
However, echoing the principle of freedom to contract, Chinese contract law provides to 
endorse the principle of voluntariness instead.  
Art. 4 of the Contract Law provides that the parties shall, pursuant to law, have the right to 
enter into a contract of their own free will, and no unit or person may unlawfully interfere.
27
 
The principle of voluntariness in the Chinese Contract Law includes the following: 
• Voluntariness in whether to enter into a contract.  
• Voluntariness in with whom to enter into a contract.   
• Parties voluntarily decide the content of a contract, provided the content does not 
violate state laws and regulations.  
                                                            
25
 2011 China White Paper on the Completion of Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics , part 3 
para4. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2011/Document/1034943/1034943_4.htm. 
26
 Art. 1 of the UNIDROIT Principles 2010. 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf  
27
 Art. 4 of the Contract Law 1999. English Translation available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383564.htm.  
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• In the performance of contract, parties can supplement or modify contract or 
terminate the contract.  
• Parties can by consensus decide the liabilities in breach of contract and can choose 
dispute resolution on a voluntary basis.
28 
 
The NPCSC, in its interpretation of the Contract Law, states that both the principle of 
freedom of contract, and the principle of voluntariness, are general principles of the Contract 
Law. It states that “in preparing the law, suggestions were made for the Contract Law to 
explicitly provide the principle of freedom of contract”. However, the NPC does not provide 
the principle of freedom of contract in the Contract Law, for the following reasons. First, it 
argues that the concept of freedom, as contained in the principle of freedom of contract, is 
difficult to handle for ideological reasons. Second, it argues that the principle of freedom of 
contract is not absolute, and that many contract laws provide that the principle of freedom of 
contract is endorsed within the legally permissible sphere.
29
 Hence, the Chinese principle of 
voluntariness recognizes a limited level of freedom of contract. Therefore, it provides 
legitimacy for the Contract Law to impose control over the format of contract for transactions 
under the state planning order, 
30
 and over the choice of dispute settlement for joint ventures 
located in China.
31
 Hence, the principle of freedom to contract was examined both in 
substance, and against state ideology (Zhang Mo, 2006, p.51). As China aimed to create a 
socialist market economy order, led by the state-owned sector, the freedom of contract 
principle was socialized to become the principle of voluntariness into its Contract Law.   
Hence, the reference to international legal norms in the ROC and the PRC contain the 
following common features. First, international legal norms are not examined or selected on a 
random basis. Rather, international legal norms are carefully examined in terms of their 
compatibility with Chinese conditions. Second, international legal norms are referred to on 
                                                            
28 The NPCSC Interpretation of the Contract Law available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flsyywd/minshang/node_2196.htm. 
29
 Supra.  
30
 Art. 38 of the Contract Law.  
31 Art. 126 of the Contract Law.  
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the precondition that the norms are compatible with China’s state ideology, collective 
interests as well as China’s incumbent legal doctrines. Third, international legal norms are 
instrumentally adapted to China’s context and interests, and institutionalized into Chinese 
society, through enforcement by the government administration system and the judiciary. 
This shows that in both the ROC and PRC, law-makers do not focus on viewing law as an 
autonomous, self-productive normative system. Rather, both legal systems have adopted 
pragmatic and instrumental attitudes towards international legal norms, including the rule of 
law.  
IV Philosophical and Ideological origins of China’s Conception of the Rule of Law   
 
The following analysis shows that a certain historical continuity exists in terms of the 
emphasis on the instrumental role of the law, from traditional Chinese philosophies to the San 
Min Zhu Yi upheld by the GMD, to Marxism and Socialist Reinventions upheld by the CCP.  
4.1 Law in Imperial China as Confucius Legalist State  
In imperial China (1600BC-1911AD), Legalism and Confucianism were the two main 
traditional Chinese philosophies that had a far reaching impact on Chinese Law. Legalism as 
represented by Han Feizi (280-233BC) holds that good ruli g, to a large extent, relies on a 
punitive set of rules institutionalized by the ruler. Confucianism, developed by Confucius 
(551-479 BC), does not completely deny law, but has a narrow conception of the role played 
by law in society. It emphasizes self-cultivation built upon values such as ren (benevolence), 
li (ritual) and de (virtue). A harmonious society, as advocated by Confucians can only be 
achieved if everyone performs such values pro-actively, and the implementation of law alone, 
can hardly achieve this (MacCormack, 1996, p.52). Hence, law remains secondary to self-
cultivation, based on values.
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Despite their different attitudes towards law, Legalism and Confucianism shared one 
common objective: namely, to achieve effective social governance. Confucians and Legalists 
viewed law as an instrument for achieving this. Law was indeed viewed as an institution 
separate from, and in some cases inferior to, moral norms, local customs and natural 
principles. However, society’s embrace of Confucianism in China’s imperial past means that 
the law was widely accepted as a coercive, but secondary, instrument used by rulers to 
maintain order.  
Throughout the history of Imperial China, Confucianism and Legalism have never been 
mutually exclusive but, rather, been organically combined by the rulers in their rulings (Xiao 
Gongquan, 2005, p.49) Imperial China, it is argued, was a Confucians-Legalist State, where it 
relied on practical Legalist measures for ruling and Confucian morality for legitimacy (Zhao 
Dingxin,2015, p.294). Confucian Morality finds its roots in the institutions set up by the 
Western Zhou Dynasty (1046-771 BC). The Mandate of Heaven (Tian Ming) was one of 
these institutions, where the ruler is thought to have a divine right to rule as long as he looks 
after the welfare of the people. It is the ruler’s good conduct that enables him to keep the 
power. The ruler’s bad behaviour risks him being overthrown and punished from heaven in 
the form of natural disasters (Chesterman, 2008) The Mandate of Heaven was incorporated 
by Confucius in his teaching to his disciples and became one integral part of Confucianism. 
Confucian Morality built upon the Mandate of Heaven thus served as the cornerstone for state 
legitimacy throughout Imperial China (Zhao Dingxin, 2015, p.79) 
While the law-making power was solely vested in the emperor, the Mandate of Heaven sets 
out de facto constraints on the exercise of power by the emperor, and the seed for the rule of 
law to develop closer to the European conception. However, the Mandate of Heaven does not 
put the ruler and the ruled on an equal footing; nor does it subject both to the binding power 
exerted by Heaven. Further, Heaven’s punishment in the form of natural disasters influence 
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the way of thinking of both the ruler and ruled who, consequently, incline to conduct more 
correlative, thinking to associate the concept by meaningful disposition rather than rational 
causation analysis. The Mandate of Heaven sets out the foundation for China to develop its 
own tradition of humanism and historical rationalism and, in the meantime, prevents China 
from developing the theoretical-formal rationality in its traditional philosophies (Zhao 
Dingxin, 2015, p.54). The combination of Confucianism-Legalism with origins from the 
Mandate of Heaven, diverged imperial China’s conception of law and the rule of law from 
that of other pre-modern societies.  
4.2 Law and San Min Zhu I in the ROC     
The ROC in its legal system building was faced with the pressing task of modernizing China 
through state building and saving China from the threat of invasion and domestic turmoil at 
the same time (Wu and Huang, 1937, p. 909). It saw heated debates among social elites on 
the way to save China. The debates centred on whether China should focus on social and 
cultural development, prior to rushing into republican system building, as maintained by 
Liang Qichao (1873-1929), or whether a constitutional parliamentary government would 
educate the mass population and transform Chinese society, as held by Zhang Shizhao (1881-
1973). Li Dazhao (1888-1927) argued that law alone could not transform society and that the 
rule by law and rule by man should be combined together in the transformation process 
(Jenco, 2010). The debate produced few theoretical findings. Nonetheless, it shows that the 
elites were disenchanted with western liberalism and rights-based legal system building, and 
strove to find China’s way.  
 
It was the San Min Chu I (Three Principles of people) architected by Dr Sun Yat-Sen that 
eventually served as an ideological basis to provide legitimacy for the ROC and its legal 
system. The GMD advocated that the ROC should uphold the following three Principles of 
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Peoples: nationalism (minzuzhuyi), democracy (minquanzhuyi) and the people’s livelihood 
(minshengzhuyi). Sun utilized three methods in developing this ideology: namely, returning 
to ancient notions of Chinese morality; returning to ancient Chinese learning; and, the 
adoption of western science (Linebarger, 1937, p.79).
 
 
 
With respect to ancient Chinese morality, a Confucian-based ethical system and traditional 
wisdom in social organization were strongly advocated by Sun. With respect to ancient 
Chinese learning, Sun believed in Chinese superiority in the social sciences, particularly in 
the field of political theory. With respect to the adoption of western science, Sun showed a 
preference for western natural science, and its methodology, over the western social sciences. 
This was because Sun believed that the west did not have similar customs and human 
sentiments as China and, therefore, was not a useful reference (Linebarger, 1937, p.79).  
 
 
Based on this, Sun argued that it was regressive for the ROC to be preoccupied with limiting 
government power (Lee, 2015). State building efforts, therefore, were made primarily 
towards the design of an authoritarian government system, rather than on how to impose 
constraints on state power (Zhao, 1996, p.29).
  
The Three Principles of the People, hence, 
modernized traditional Chinese elitism into a Leninist pri ciple of enlightened leadership 
(Greiff, 1985).
 
  
 
Sun’s conception of law is fundamentally different from the individual-rights-based 
conception of law. He denies natural rights and de-emphasizes the role of law to maximize 
individual interests based on inalienable rights held by individuals. His social service theory 
of law argues that law is a means to harmonize social interests, and every agent and 
institution in Chinese society should serve for collective societal purposes. Sun referred back 
to Confucianism, where he stressed natural human sympathy and the sense of social duty in 
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the Confucianism tradition served as the basis for law and justice. He further argued that 
human feelings (Qing) and the rationality of matter (Li) are interwoven with the law. State 
made law and Li, according to Sun, are integrated into one body to bind the whole of Chinese 
society (Shia Ling Liu, 1966). It was in this background that the legal system in the ROC was 
predominantly viewed as the instrument to realize statist interests rather than individual 
interests. The GMD declared that law-making must serve and be consistent with GMD 
ideology and doctrines, on the ground that such a legal system would be able to save China 
from the threat of invasion and domestic chaos (Wu Jingxiong et al, 1937, p.909).
 
   
4.3 Law and the CCP’s Socialist Ideological Reinvention  
In the P.R.China, the CCP under the leadership of Mao Zedong (1893-1976), Deng Xiaoping 
(1904-1997), Jiang Zeming (b1926), Hu Jingtao (b1942) and Xi Jingping (b1953) have 
experienced continuous ideological rein entions, with the aim of strengthening its ideological 
legitimacy in line with China’s fast developing economic reform. These ideological 
reinventions have adapted Marxism and Leninism theories into China’s context, and referred 
to traditional Confucian morality for inspiration. Both Marxism and the CCP’s ideological 
reinventions have exerted a far-reaching impact on the conception of law and the rule of law 
in China. 
Marxism was regarded as the original and most authoritative source for the conception of law 
in the jurisprudence of contemporary China (Zhang Mo, 2010). Marx recognized Law in its 
positive forms but focused on understanding the role of law in society, rather than on law per 
se (Barron et al, 2002, p.240). In Marx’s theory of class struggle, law reflects the will of the 
ruling class and is an instrument used by the ruling class. Hence Marx’s sociological 
understanding of law focuses on the instrumentality role of law in social evolution (Collins, 
1982, pp. 2-14).
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 In Mao’s ideological reinvention, the ruling class was expanded from the working class to 
include the peasantry and others, and the role of law was, hence, viewed as an instrument 
used by the ruling class to suppress and eradicate the capitalist class through a Leninist style 
state apparatus (Wu, 2013, p.72). During this period, Mao Zedong returned to traditional 
values in Confucianism, when necessary, and viewed the law as a useful tool to achieve 
political ends, ensuring that the formal legal system did not hinder the interests of his broader 
political movement (Leng, 1977, p.356). At the 12th CCP congress in 1982, Deng Xiaoping 
pledged to construct socialism with Chinese Characteristics.
32
 Deng’s proposal officially set 
China on the trajectory of an alternative development model. In this trajectory, the CCP has 
the determination to redress development and faces the tasks of regaining socialism in terms 
of common prosperity, social justice, freedom and democracy (Lin Chun, 2006, p.12)  
Jiang Zeming reinvented China’s state ideology with the three Represents theory, with the 
aim of expanding the CCP’s ideological legitimacy. The theory argues that given Chinese 
characteristics of socialism, the productivity of society is no longer represented by the 
working class. The CCP represents the development trends of all advanced productive forces, 
the orientations of an advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming 
majority of the people of China.
33 
At the 15
th
 CCP Party Congress in 1997, Jiang Zemin 
proposed that rule by law should be the core component of a socialist legal system and 
formally started the CCP’s efforts to theorize the socialist legal system. It provides that:  
Ruling the country by law means that the broad masses of the people, under the 
leadership of the Party and in accordance with the Constitution and other laws, 
participate in one way or another and through all possible channels in managing state 
affairs, economic and cultural undertakings and social affairs, and see to it that all 
work of the state proceeds in keeping with law, and that socialist democracy is 
gradually institutionalized and codified so that such institutions and laws will not 
                                                            
32
 Deng Xiaoping  Opening Speech on the CCP 12
th
 Congress in 1982, available at  
http://www.china.com.cn/17da/2007-10/10/content_9029167.htm. 
33
 Jiang Zeming Speech on the 80
TH
 Anniversary Conference of the CCP in 2001, available at 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2001/Jul/42177.htm.   
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change with changes in the leadership or changes in the views or focus of attention of 
any leader.  
However, the rule by law emphasized setting out institutionalized rules for governance and 
particularly in ensuring that the Party’s basic polices were achieved successfully. It did not 
touch on the issue of imposing meaningful constraints on the CCP as the ruling Party 
(Peerenboom, 2001). The main challenge encountered by the CCP in the theorization process 
is the tangled relationship between the Supremacy of the CCP in the law-making process 
based on the state ideology on the one hand, and the CCP’s increasingly need for subjecting 
itself to a rules-based system in order to strengthen its regulatory capacity as a ruling party on 
the other.  
In response, Jiang Zeming highlighted that it is essential to unify the relationship among the 
CCP leadership, the People’s Congress System and the rule by law:   
In ruling the country by law, we can unify the adherence to Party leadership, the 
development of people's democracy and do things in strict accordance with the law, 
thus ensuring, institutionally and legally, that the Party's basic line and basic policies 
are carried out without fail, and that the Party plays the role of the core of leadership 
at all times, commanding the whole situation and coordinating the efforts of all 
quarters. 
In 2003, Hu Jintao proposed the “scientific outlook of development theory”. It aimed to 
tackle the widening social discrepancies in Chinese society by, among other things, 
improving the legal system. This ideological innovation interpreted Confucian values through 
a socialist lens and pledged to build a harmonious society (hexie shehui) (Wu, 2013, p.74). 
However, the CCP’s governance of Chinese society relied mainly on traditional grievance 
processing (Gallagher, 2005).
 
Law, in the process, continued to be conceived as one 
instrument to achieve the CCP’s goal of stability, and ideological control was imposed onto 
the functioning of the legal system towards this goal (Minzner, 2011). 
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In the CCP’s annual national conference on political-legal work attended by judges and 
procuratorators in 2007, Hu Jingtao urged the attendees to uphold the Three Supremes, 
namely, the Supremacy of the CCP causes, the Supremacy of the People’s Interests and the 
Supremacy of the Constitution and Laws. The Supremacy of CCP causes means that the 
socialist rule of law is to serve the socialist construction led by the CCP. The Supremacy of 
People’s Interests is embodied mainly through the National People’s Congress system. The 
Supremacy of the Constitution and Laws refers to the fact that no organization or individual 
can have a prerogative that exceeds what is provided by laws, and must comply within the 
law.
34
   
The Three Supremes can be regarded as a continued effort made by the CCP in its 
theorization of the socialist legal system. Chinese scholars’ theoretical explorations centre on 
the argument that there are no conflicts of interests among the CCP, the National People’s 
Congress System and the Law, as all three are concerned with the same goal of representing 
and achieving the people’s interest. First, The CCP as the leading party is determined to serve 
the people. In order to achieve this, it must act within the law. Second, the socialist ideology 
determines that the PRC’s constitution and laws serve the people and are made under the 
leadership of the CCP. Third, to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution requires the 
upholding of the supremacy of the CCP and people’s interests (Zhu Liheng 2009). Despite 
the theoretical vagueness, the key argument used to justify the Three Supremes lies in the 
conception of law as an instrument to serve the people. Such an instrumental conception is 
then used to connect the CCP, the NPC and the state-made law, under one framework.         
At the 3
rd
 Plenum of the 18
th
 CCP Central Congress, the CCP under Xi’s leadership issued 
the Decision on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform and 
                                                            
34
 Dong Hua, comment on Upholding the Three Supremes and Developing the Scientific Outlook to a New High 
Level, available at http://old.chinacourt.org/html/article/200812/04/333915.shtml 
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pledged to strengthen the rule of law construction in China.
35
 At the 4
th
 Plenum of the 18
th
 
Central Congress in 2014, the CCP issued the CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning 
Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance according To Law (Decision). The 
Decision aims to establish a system of socialist rule of law, which is composed by a complete 
system of laws and regulations; an effective law enforcement system; a system to supervise 
the rule of law; a system to safeguard the rule of law; and, a complete Intra-CCP rules 
system.36 
The CCP’s Decision reveals the determination to expand its socialist legal system 
theorization building. To this end, two observations can be made. First, the CCP proposes to 
build the principle of “Liang Fa shi Shan Zhi de Qian Ti” (good law serves as the 
precondition for good governance). The principle was originally developed from the work of 
Wang Anshi (1021-1086 AD), a prominent politician and thinker in the Song dynasty (960-
1127AD). Wang Anshi argued that “Li Shan Fa Yu Tian Xia, Ze Tian Xia Zhi; Li Shan Fa Yu 
Yi Guo, Ze Yi Guo Zhi” (make good law in the orld, then the world can be governed; make 
good law in a country, then the country can be governed). Wang Anshi advocated this 
principle to be upheld by a ruler who had the quality as a Jun Zi (Gentry) and highlighted that 
Gentry had eternal virtues not to be changed by environment.
 37
   
The principle of Liang Fa and Shan Zhi is regarded as the foundation for China’s substantive 
rule of law discourse. However, the CCP’s definition of good law is not restricted to the 
morality of law as advocated by Wang Anshi. Nor does the definition aim to develop a rights-
based internal morality of law, supporting the western conception of the rule of law.  
                                                            
35
 CCP Decision on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform CCP, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494_3.htm. 
36
 CCP Decision Concerning Several Major Issues In Comprehensively Advancing Governance According To 
Law, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-10/29/c_1113033772.htm. 
37
 Chapter on Zhou Gong, in Wang Anshi Work, available at 
http://www.readers365.com/8dajia/html07/mydoc07067.htm.  
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The Decision provides that a law is good when, substantively, it is based on people’s interests; 
serves the people; is consistent with socialist core values
38
; is compatible with the 
Constitution; and when formally, it is made through open, fair and just law making 
procedures; and is made in a timely, systematic, precise and effective manner.
39
 The CCP, 
clearly, calls for a formal rule of law construction within its legal system. However, in its 
formulation of a substantive rule of law discourse, it awaits to be seen how core socialist 
values will be developed through political theories compatible with China’s context. At this 
stage the principle of serving the people plays a key role in China’s substantive rule of law 
discourse. This conception originates, in a fundamental way, from Marx’s instrumental 
conception of law and serves, in a functional manner, to strengthen the legitimacy of both the 
socialist legal system and the CCP.    
Second, the CCP aims to consolidate the formal rule of law construction by strengthening its 
intra-party disciplinary rules system. The CCP has started its intra-party disciplinary system 
reconstruction in 2012 and striven to regulate the Party with a more stringent rules-based 
intra-party disciplinary system, following the 18
th
 CCP Congress 6
th
 Plenum in October 2016. 
40
 Such a reform is deemed necessary as the CCP, as a ruling party, requires an 
institutionalized and rules-based system to impose constraints on the exercise of power by 
party members; support the sustainability of the CCP; and improve the compatibility of the 
CCP rules and the state-made law (Wang Zhengming and Shi Xingzhou, 2016, p.83). Such a 
reform is deemed beneficial to China’s construction of the rule of law, because the CCP intra- 
party rules are regarded as a more effective tool to curb the Party’s exercise of power, which 
would then, effectively, safeguard the equality of law within the state law system (Wang 
                                                            
38
 Pursuant to the CCP’s 18
th
 Congress 4
rd
 Plenum in 2014, the CCP has proposed the socialist core value 
systems to include “ Prosperity, Democracy, Civilization, Harmony, Freedom, Fairness, Justice, the Rule of Law, 
Patriotism, Dedication, Integrity and Friendship”  available at  http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/120709/. 
39
 Same as 35.  
40
 The CCP Intra Party Supervision Rule, adopted and publicized at the CCP 18
th
 Congress 6yh Plenum in 2016, 
available http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-11/02/c_1119838242.htm. 
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Liming, 2016, p.31). Hence, the rebuilding of the intra-party disciplinary system can be 
viewed as an effort made by the CCP to disentangle the CCP, the National People’s Congress 
and the state-made law from their origin. It waits to be seen to what extent the development 
of the intra-party rules system and its linkage with state-made law, would be subject to the 
rule of law. Nonetheless, the CCP has chosen to turn away from state-made law and return to 
its intra disciplinary system, to tackle its rule of law challenges. This reflects the fact that the 
CCP has not shifted from the conception that the state-made law functions as an instrument 
through which to channel policy goals. While the CCP has expanded its rule of law discourse, 
its conception of the instrumentality of the law continues to dominate thus far.   
In reviewing legal modernization reforms carried out in the ROC and in the PRC, it becomes 
clear that the Chinese favouritism towards the instrumentality of the law is historical and 
continuous. The Confucianism-Legalism tradition sets China apart from other pre-modern 
societies, with respect to the understanding of legality, the internal morality of the law and 
the social roles of the law. This fundamental, instrumental conception of the law has set the 
philosophical and historical basis for the GMD and the CCP to strengthen the legitimacy of 
their instrumental conception of the law and expand their construction of the rule of law 
discourse. The GMD and the CCP’s continuing instrumental conception of the law has, 
historically, led China on a rule of law path which has diverged from the west. The historical 
legacy of this development has strengthened and solidified the conception of law as an 
instrument, in Chinese society. The interaction of Confucianism and Legalism, and the rule of 
law construction, in both the ROC and the PRC have shaped the rule of law discourse to 
centre on the instrumentality of the law. This, in turn, makes the instrumental role of the law 
a strong feature of China’s legal culture.  
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V Conclusion  
Since the PRC started its market oriented reform, it has made massive efforts to enact, amend 
or revoke laws, with the aim of building up a structured and comprehensive legal order. 
Despite its rapid enactment of numerous laws, China’s rule of law has made little progress in 
the eyes of the international legal community.  
This experience is, however, not new in China. Similar efforts were made by the GMD in the 
ROC and similar criticism was received from the international legal community regarding its 
rule of law.   
By comparing the Statute of Legislative Order of the ROC in 1927, and the Legislation Law 
of the PRC in 2000, this paper shows that there exists a strong similarity with regard to the 
conception of the rule of law during these two periods. The instrumental role of the law was 
treated as the predominant content of the rule of law. The formation of such a local 
perception, on the rule of law, is largely due to the historical continuity of China’s legal 
borrowing strategy on the one hand, and the favour over law’s instrumentality running 
through Chinese legal culture in the past hundred years  on the other. 
However, such a strong emphasis on the instrumental nature of the law poses challenges to 
both China’s and the world’s sustainable development. First, there is a limited and ineffective 
role played by law in China’s social governance. Second, the law-making process in China 
becomes vulnerable to manipulation by interest–driven agents within the process. It waits to 
be seen how these challenges will be tackled by China’s on-going rule of law construction. 
China’s rule of law discourse does not, however, take place in a vacuum. Hence, critical 
analysis on the historical and contextual factors which have shaped China’s rule of law 
conception in its modernization efforts, can establish the basis for us to better understand the 
embeddedness which continues to guide, shape and influence the rule of law in China.  
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